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to investment bankers would hold them directly liable to share-
holders in the buyout context, given that the shareholders are the
primary beneficiaries of their fairness opinions.36 The standard es-
tablished by the First Department in Schneider, however, imposes
liability regardless of whether the bankers knew that the share-
holders would potentially rely on their advice. On the other hand,
use of a more traditional framework of third party liability, that
does not improperly superimpose agency theory on a corporate re-
lationship, furthers the policy considerations favoring the exten-
sion of liability without unreasonably expanding the scope of an
investment banker's liability.
John J. Kim
Defense barred under New York State Constitution from racially
discriminating through exercise of peremptory challenges
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 270.25 affords both
prosecutors and criminal defendants the right to exercise per-
dictions, derived from the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 552 (1965), which permits
recovery by any foreseeable plaintiff. Credit Alliance, 65 N.Y.2d at 553, 483 N.E.2d at 119,
493 N.Y.S.2d at 444; see, e.g., Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 122 N.H. 898, 904,
451 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982) (accountant liable to all foreseeable plaqutiffs); Blue Bell, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. App. Dallas 1986) (foreseeability
expanded to all parties accountant "knew, or should have known" would receive
information).
The general trend in accountant liability seems to be moving toward a more expansive
basis of liability and away from the previous rule that an accountant could not be liable for
mere negligence to a non-contractual party. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931). In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo expressed the concern that
holding accountants liable to third parties for mere negligence would "expose accountants to
a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."
Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. The realities of the accountant's increasingly vital role has,
however, led many courts to recognize the need for an enhanced degree of legal responsibil-
ity. See Mess, supra note 34, at 855.
"8 See Note, supra note 1, at 136 n.93; Wells, 127 A.D.2d at 202-03, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
In Wells, the court held that the investment bankers were liable to the stockholders for
their negligent preparation of a fairness opinion because they must have been aware of the
stockholders' reliance on their opinion. Id.
37 See Schneider, 159 A.D.2d at 296, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 574. In Schneider, the sharehold-
ers never alleged reliance, nor any claim that the investment bankers' advice was passed on
or was intended to be passed on to the shareholders. Id. It is submitted, therefore, that
investment bankers should not be subject to an unlimited scope of liability, but should,
however, be accountable for damages caused by their negligent advice if the injured party
was a foreseeable one.
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emptory challenges.' In Batsor v. Kentucky,2 the United States
Supreme Court limited the state's use of peremptory challenges by
holding that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits the prosecution from exercising peremptory chal-
lenges in a racially discriminatory manner.3 The Batson Court,
1 See CPL § 270.25 (McKinney 1982). Section 270.25(1) defines a peremptory challenge
as "an objection to a prospective juror for which no reason need be assigned." Id. It then
sets forth the number of peremptory challenges each party is permitted to use according to
the class of crime involved. See id. at 270.25(2); see also People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87,
97-99, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 747-48 (2d Dep't 1981) (detailed discussion of history of peremp-
tory challenge in New York).
476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Id. at 89. Batson drastically changed the law in this area insofar as it lifted a heavy
burden from the shoulders of criminal defendants attempting to challenge a prosecutor's
exercise of peremptory challenges on racial grounds. See id. at 101-02 (White, J., concur-
ring). Prior to Batson, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), served as the governing stan-
dard in determining when the prosecutor's use of peremptories violated the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 90-93. In Swain, a black de-
fendant asserted an equal protection violation due to the prosecutor's exercise of peremp-
tory challenges to exclude all black jurors. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203. In view of the significant
purpose the peremptory challenge serves in our criminal justice system, the Swain Court
was reluctant to sacrifice the peremptory challenge by subjecting each of the prosecutor's
challenges to the traditional demands of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
clause. Id. at 221-22. To do so, the Court held, "would establish a rule wholly at odds with
the peremptory challenge system as we know it." Id. at 222. Instead, the Court created a
rebuttable presumption that every state challenge exercised by the prosecutor is exercised
for the purpose of obtaining a fair and impartial jury. Id. This presumption would not be
overcome by a defendant's mere allegation of racial discrimination. Id. To successfully rebut
the presumption, the Swain Court required proof of a prosecutor's continuous, systematic
exclusion of blacks in "case after case," for reasons wholly unrelated to the case being tried.
See id. at 223-24; Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic
Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 12 (1988).
The "case after case" requirement forced a defendant to go outside the realm of his own
case to gather evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptories. See Swain,
380 U.S. at 224-25; see also Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for
the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1161 (1966) (defendant re-
quired to show "prosecutor's conduct... in earlier trials ... in which he was not involved..
. [and] which his opportunities for gathering evidence are severely restricted"). The practi-
cal difficulties involved in meeting this standard are evidenced by the dearth of cases hold-
ing that invidious discrimination has been demonstrated under the Swain standard. See
Raphael, Discriminatory Jury Selection: Lower Court Implementation of Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 25 WILLAME'rrE L. REv. 293, 299 & n.36 (1989); Note, Rethinking Limitations on the
Peremptory Challenge, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1362 & n.31 (1985). Swain was highly criti-
cized for the overwhelming burden it imposed on defendants alleging racially discriminatory
tactics in the jury selection process. See, e.g., Raphael, supra, at 299 (defendant's burden
under Swain "impossible to meet"); Brown, McGuire & Winters, The Peremptory Chal-
lenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 Naw ENG.
L. REV. 192, 197 (1978) ("major problem" with Swain is defendant's "heavy, yet poorly
articulated burden of proof"); Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 235, 293, 302 (1968) (depicting Swain as "blind to realities" and "an insurmountable
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however, specifically declined to decide whether the same restric-
obstacle to the vindication of ... constitutional rights").
Batson held that a defendant could establish "a prima facie case of purposeful discrimi-
nation. . . solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges
at the defendant's trial." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Thus, under Batson, defendants are no
longer required to conduct surveys of prosecutorial conduct in past trials prior to alleging an
equal protection violation. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Batson articulated several factors for determining whether a prima facie case has been
established. Id. at 96-97. First, the defendant "must show that he is a member of a cogniza-
ble racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
from the venire members of the defendant's race." Id. at 96 (citation omitted). This stan-
dard has since been extended to grant a criminal defendant standing to allege a Batson
violation without being a member of the group against which bias is claimed. See Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991) (criminal defendant has standing to raise third-party equal pro-
tection claims of jurors excluded by prosecution because of race regardless of defendant's
race). See also Holland v. Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 803 (1990) wherein the same argument posited
under sixth amendment fair cross section requirement was rejected. Second, it is presumed
that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that gives those who are in-
clined to discriminate an opportunity to do so. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Lastly, "the defend-
ant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that
the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race." Id. The presence of these factors "raises the necessary inference of purposeful
discrimination." Id. In determining whether a defendant has made the requisite prima facie
showing, the Batson Court deferred largely to trial courts, directing them to consider "all
relevant circumstances." See id. at 96-97. Illustrating the types of factors to be considered,
the Court stated that "a 'pattern' of strikes" against black jurors as well as questions and
statements by the prosecutor during voir dire "may support or refute an inference of dis-
criminatory purpose." See id. at 97. Once a prima facie showing has been made, "the burden
shifts to the State to come forward with a [racially] neutral explanation for challenging
black jurors." Id. Although this burden does not rise to the level of explanations justifying
challenges for cause, "the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant's prima facie case.., by
stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption ... that
they would be partial to the defendant." Id. Nor can the. prosecutor rebut the defendant's
prima facie case by simply denying any discriminatory motive or assuring the court of his
good faith. Id. at 98.
New York appellate courts have recognized Batson's retroactive application to cases
tried prior to Batson, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), and have remitted
cases for the purpose of conducting reconstructive/evidentiary hearings to permit the prose-
cutor to proffer racially neutral explanations for the peremptorily challenged jurors in ques-
tion. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 558 N.Y.S.2d 44, 45-46 (1st Dep't 1990) (remanded to allow
prosecutor "meaningful opportunity" to provide race-neutral reasons for striking black ju-
rors); People v. Bryant, 159 A.D.2d 962, 962, 552 N.Y.S.2d 778, 778 (4th Dep't 1990) (same);
People v. Dove, 154 A.D.2d 705, 705, 546 N.Y.S.2d 686, 686 (2d Dep't 1989) (same). Because
Batson creates a rebuttable presumption of purposeful discrimination upon the defendant's
showing of a prima facie case of discrimination, evidentiary hearings are necessary to afford
the people an opportunity to rebut the presumption. Similarly, courts have remanded cases
for the purpose of providing defense counsel an opportunity to make a prima facie showing
of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution in accordance with the
Batson standards. See, e.g., People v. Hockett, 121 A.D.2d 878, 879, 503 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996
(1st Dep't 1986) (remand for evidentiary hearing out of "fairness"). Where reconstructive
hearings are impossible, however, courts have simply ordered new trials. See People v. Scott,
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tion applies to the defense.4 Recently, in People v. Kern,5 the New
York Court of Appeals held that the civil rights clause of the New
York State Constitution' prohibits purposeful discrimination in
the exercise of peremptory challenges, whether exercised by the
prosecution or the defense.7 In addition, the court held that the
judicial enforcement of a defendant's racially discriminatory per-
emptory challenge constitutes state action violative of the equal
protection provision of the state constitution.8
70 N.Y.2d 420, 426, 516 N.E.2d 1208, 1212, 522 N.Y.S.2d 94, 98 (1987) (evidentiary hearing
inappropriate due to absence of record, four-year lapse from time of trial and departure of
presiding trial judge from trial court); People v. Kinard, 151 A.D.2d 963, 964, 542 N.Y.S.2d
413, 414 (4th Dep't 1989) (new trial granted where 10-year lapse from time of trial and
death of trial judge rendered reconstruction hearing impossible). But see People v. Lincoln,
145 A.D.2d 924, 924, 536 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609 (4th Dep't 1988) (ordered reconstruction hearing
despite trial judge's departure from trial court since trial judge available to testify).
4 Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12 (declining to express "views on whether the Constitution
imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel"). In his
concurring opinion, however, Justice Marshall noted that the "potential for racial prejudice
• . . inheres in the defendant's challenge as well." Id. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring). In
addition, in his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger predicted that the same restrictions
being imposed on the prosecution's use of peremptories inevitably would be applied to de-
fense counsel. See id. at 125-26 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Recently, the Supreme Court
again declined to expressly address the issue of defense counsel's exercise of peremptory
challenges. See Alabama v. Cox, 488 U.S. 1018, 1018 (1989). Despite the Supreme Court's
failure to define the parameters of defense peremptory challenges to date, the Court's most
recent extension of Batson in Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991), see supra note 3, has
triggered the concern of the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys who "pre-
dict that the Court may now turn its attention to the jury selection practices of defense
lawyers." See London, Race and Juries: Burden Could Shift to Defense, N.Y. Times, April
5, 1991, at B18, col. 3.
Several legal commentators and lower New York courts advocate the application of
Batson to the defense. See, e.g., Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Chal-
lenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 355, 355 (1988) (arguing that discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challanges by defense would "violate[] the equal protection clause
and erode[] the community's belief in the fairness of the justice system"); see also infra
note 14 (lower New York courts applying Batson to defense).
75 N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
6 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
' See id. at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658. The state and federal equal
protection clauses prohibit only discrimination that constitutes state action. See id. at 653,
554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. The Supreme Court has held that the acts of a
private individual will constitute state action if there is "a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action ... so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated
as that of the State itself." See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974); see also The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (equal protection clause ap-
plies only to state action). This test was intended to be flexible, finding state action only
upon a careful weighing of all relevant facts and circumstances. See Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). It has been suggested that to designate the criminal
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Kern involved a highly publicized trial which stemmed from
the controversial Howard Beach racial incident in which a group of
white teenagers attacked three black men.9 The December, 1986
attack resulted in the death of one of the black men, Michael Grif-
fith, and the severe beating of another, Cedric Sandiford. 10 Three
of the defendants tried were convicted of charges including man-
slaughter, assault, and conspiracy." During jury selection, defense
counsel began exercising peremptory challenges to exclude pro-
spective black jurors. 12 The prosecution moved to require defense
counsel to provide racially neutral explanations for peremptorily
challenging black jurors.'3 The trial court granted the prosecution's
defendant's use of peremptory challenges as state action would be an unprecedented expan-
sion of the state action doctrine. See Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use of the Peremp-
tory Challenge, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 46, 56-57 (1987).
9 See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 643, 554 N.E.2d at 1236, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648. The three black
men who were attacked were Michael Griffith, Cedric Sandiford, and Timothy Grimes. Id.
at 643, 554 N.E.2d at 1236-37, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 648-49. Testimony revealed that their car
had broken down near a pizzeria where the incident took place and they walked into the
town of Howard Beach to seek assistance. Id. At the same time, a group of white teenagers
were attending a birthday party in Howard Beach. Id. at 643, 554 N.E.2d at 1237, 555
N.Y.S.2d at 649. While driving home another party-goer, two of the teenagers encountered
Griffith, Sandiford, and Grimes crossing the street toward the pizzeria. Id. There was con-
flicting testimony regarding this confrontation. See id. When the teenagers returned to the
party, one shouted "[tihere were some niggers on the boulevard, let's go up there and kill
them." Id. at 644, 554 N.E.2d at 1237, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The group arrived at the pizze-
ria wielding bats and clubs and chased the three blacks yelling "[n]iggers, get * * * out of
the neighborhood." Id.
10 Id. at 645-46, 554 N.E.2d at 1238, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 650. The three blacks ran in dif-
ferent directions to escape their attackers. Id. at 644, 554 N.E.2d at 1237, 555 N.Y.S.2d at
649. Grimes escaped. Id. Griffith ran onto a six-lane highway and was accidently struck by a
car and killed. Id. at 645, 554 N.E.2d at 1238, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 650. Sandiford was beaten
with baseball bats and tree limbs, but ultimately survived the attack. Id. at 645-46, 554
N.E.2d at 1238, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
" Id. at 648, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651. Scott Kern, Jon Lester, Jason
Ladone, and Michael Pirone were tried. Kern and Lester were convicted of second degree
manslaughter, first degree assault and fifth degree conspiracy. Id. Ladone was convicted of
second degree manslaughter and first degree assault. Id. Pirone was acquitted of all charges
against him. Id. at 643 n.1, 554 N.E.2d at 1237 n.1, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 649 n.1. In addition, in
exchange for his cooperation, Robert Riley pled guilty to second degree assault in satisfac-
tion of all charges arising out of his involvement in the incident. See People v. Riley, 152
A.D.2d 757, 757-58, 545 N.Y.S.2d 37, 37-38 (2d Dep't 1989).
12 See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 647, 554 N.E.2d at 1239, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 651. On the first
day of jury selection, after unsuccessfully challenging for cause several black jurors, defense
counsel began using peremptories to exclude blacks. Id. The defense then applied for eight
additional peremptory challenges arguing that "the black jurors did not 'want to be excused.
They're coming in here, volunteering,' whereas white jurors 'who aren't anxious to serve are
using all kinds of excuses to get off any duty."' Id. The trial court denied the request. Id.
13 Id.
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motion, holding that the principles set forth in Batson were appli-
cable to the defense.14 The Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, affirmed and concluded that the systematic exercise of pe-
remptory challenges by either the prosecution or the defense to
exclude blacks from the jury solely on the basis of race violates
both the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause and arti-
cle I, section 2 of the New York State Constitution.15 The Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the Appellate Division's decision 16
holding that the civil rights and equal protection clauses of the
New York State Constitution,17 rather than the federal equal pro-
" Id. Immediately after the trial court issued its Batson ruling, the defendants insti-
tuted an article 78 proceeding seeking to prohibit enforcement of the trial court's order. See
Ladone v. Demakos, 133 A.D.2d 435, 435, 519 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (2d Dep't), appeal denied,
70 N.Y.2d 607, 514 N.E.2d 389, 519 N.Y.S.2d 1031 (1987). The Appellate Division, Second
Department, denied the application based upon the "availability of an adequate remedy at
law, i.e., appeal." Id. at 436, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
Following the trial court's ruling, Elizabeth Holtzman, the Kings County District Attor-
ney, sought a judgment "declaring that both the United States and New York State Consti-
tutions prohibit defense counsel from exercising 'race-based' peremptory challenges." Holtz-
man v. Supreme Court of N.Y., Kings County, 139 Misc. 2d 109, 111, 526 N.Y.S.2d 892, 893
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1988), af'd, 152 A.D.2d 724, 545 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2d Dep't),
appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 616, 549 N.E.2d 478; 550 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1989). Holtzman con-
tended that her office had witnessed "'persistent use of peremptory challenges by criminal
defendants and their attorneys along racial lines.'" Id. at 111, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 893 (quoting
plaintiff's verified complaint). The court denied Holtzman relief on grounds ultimately sanc-
tioned in Kern. See id. at 118-21, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 898-900 (rejecting contention that defense
counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action under federal and state
equal protection clauses). Subsequent cases reached the opposite result. See People v. Pier-
mont, 143 Misc. 2d 839, 842, 542 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (Westchester County Ct. 1989) (holding
state action not required for Batson's applicability to discriminatory defense challanges
since state constitution broader than federal prohibition against racial discrimination); Peo-
ple v. Davis,, 142 Misc. 2d 881, 887-88, 537 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1988)
("racially discriminatory defense peremptory challenges constitutes State action... because
the Trial Judge and other State officials must participate, facilitate and acquiesce in the
racial discrimination"); People v. Gary M., 138 Misc. 2d 1081, 1089, 526 N.Y.S.2d 986, 994
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988) (defendant's racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
constitute state action since state "supplies the tools ... the place ... the object ... the
setting ... and enforces the discrimination"); People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 1062,
526 N.Y.S.2d 367, 371 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988) (racially motivated exclusion of juror
by defense violates juror's equal protection right in view of state's "participation, facilitation
and acquiescence" in discrimination), aff'd on other grounds, 159 A.D.2d 651, 553 N.Y.S.2d
39 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 740, 557 N.E.2d 1198, 558 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1990).
15 People v. Kern, 149 A.D.2d 187, 234, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4, 34 (2d Dep't 1989), af'd, 75
N.Y.2d 638, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
:' Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 659, 554 N.E.2d at 1247, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
7 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. The New York State Constitution provides, in pertinent
part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be
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tection clause, prohibit the discriminatory exercise of peremptory
challenges by the defense.18
Writing for the court, Judge Alexander recognized that New
York's civil rights clause prohibits discrimination of only those
rights "'elsewhere declared' by Constitution, statute or common
law." 19 Thus, the court construed jury service to be a civil right
provided for under article I, section 1 of the state constitution,20
subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other person or by any
firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the
state.
Id. The first sentence of article I, section 2, is New York's equal protection provision which,
like its federal counterpart, applies only to state action. See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 650-51, 554
N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653; see also Under 21, Catholic Home Bureau for Depen-
dent Children v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 360 n.6, 482 N.E.2d 1, 7 n.6, 492
N.Y.S.2d 522, 528 n.6 (1985) ("[w]e have held that the State ... equal protection clause...
is no broader in coverage than the Federal provision... and this equation... extends to the
requirement of 'State action' "); Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 314, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094,
452 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (1982) ("State guarantee of equal protection 'is as broad in its cover-
age as that of the Fourteenth Amendment'" (quoting Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94,
102, 209 N.E.2d 778, 782, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, 450 (1965))).
The second sentence, New York's civil rights clause, "prohibits private as well as State
discrimination as to 'civil rights.'" See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555
N.Y.S.2d at 653; see also Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 531, 87 N.E.2d
541, 548 (1949) ("[tlhe second sentence ... although applicable to private persons... pro-
tects only against 'discrimination in * * * civil rights' "), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
:8 See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
'9 Id. at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1241, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 653. In Dorsey, the Court of Appeals
referred to the record of the 1938 New York State Constitutional Convention and held that
the civil rights provision is not "self-executing" and required "legislative implementation to
be effective." Dorsey, 299 N.Y. at 531, 87 N.E.2d at 548; see also Holtzman v. Supreme
Court of the State of New York, Kings County, 139 Misc. 2d 109, 119-20, 526 N.Y.S.2d 892,
899 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1988) (discussing Dorsey's interpretation of New York's
equal protection provision), aff'd, 152 A.D.2d 724, 545 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2d Dep't), appeal de-
nied, 74 N.Y.2d 616, 549 N.E.2d 478, 550 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1989).
20 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 651-52, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654. Article I, section
1 of the New York State Constitution provides that "[n]o member of this state shall be...
deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof.. . ." N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 1. The Kern court determined that jury service is a "'privilege[] of citizenship'
secured to the citizens of this State by article I, § 1 of the State Constitution." Kern, 75
N.Y.2d at 651, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654. Echoing Batson's concern for ex-
cluded jurors and society as a whole, the court emphasized that "jury service is a means of
participation in government." Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654. Conse-
quently, racially motivated peremptory challenges deny to prospective jurors an "opportu-
nity to participate in the administration of justice, and... harm[] society by impairing the
integrity of the criminal trial process." Id. The court rejected defense counsels' argument
that such fundamental concerns incorporated in article I, section 1 extend only to qualifica-
tion for jury service on the venire. Id. Judge Alexander observed that "[a] citizen's privilege
to be free of racial discrimination in the qualification for jury service is hardly a privilege if
that individual may nevertheless be kept from service on the petit jury solely because of
race." Id.
1991]
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Judiciary Law section 500,21 and Civil Rights Law section 13,22
which may not be denied to citizens solely on the basis of race.
Moreover, the court rejected defense counsel's argument that Bat-
son fails to restrict their exercise of peremptory challenges on the
ground that such conduct is not state action and thus not subject
to the mandates of the equal protection clause.23 After noting ap-
plicable guidelines for determining the existence of state action,24
the court reasoned that the state is "inevitably and inextricably
involved in the process of excluding jurors as a result of a defend-
ant's peremptory challenges. '25 Consequently, the court concluded
21 Id. at 652, 554 N.E.2d at 1242-43, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 654-55. New York's Judiciary Law
section 500 sets forth the New York State Legislature's declared policy that "all eligible
citizens shall have the opportunity to serve on grand and petit juries." N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500
(McKinney Supp. 1991).
22 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at 1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655. New York's Civil
Rights Law section 13 provides that "[n]o citizen of the state ... shall be disqualified to
serve as a... petit juror in any court of this state on account of race ...... N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAW § 13 (McKinney 1976). The court also rejected defense counsel's argument that this
statute applies only to actions of the Jury Commissioner and not to their exercise of pe-
remptory challenges under CPL section 270.25. See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653, 554 N.E.2d at
1243, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
2 See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 656-57, 554 N.E.2d at 1244-45, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
24 Id. at 655-56, 554 N.E.2d at 1244-45, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57. Recognizing that "there
is no precise formula to determine State responsibility under the [federal equal protection]
clause," the Kern court was guided by the fair attribution test set forth in Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982), which held that state action is present when
there is "conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right... fairly attributable
to the State." See Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 655, 554 N.E.2d at 1244, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (quoting
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937). The court then distinguished Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312
(1981), which held that a public defender's withdrawal of an appeal constitutes a private
function and hence, not action under color of state law under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, from
cases involving affirmative acts by the state in discriminatory conduct. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at
655-56, 554 N.E.2d at 1244-45, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 656-57. In determining whether an act is
affirmative, the court focused on the nature and "degree of involvement by the State .. .
such that the coercive power of the State has been enlisted to enforce private discrimina-
tion." Id. at 656, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657.
25 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 656, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657. Relying on the
practicalities involved in jury selection, the court stated:
[I]t is the Judge, with the full coercive authority of the State, who enforces the
discriminatory decision by ordering the excused juror to leave the courtroom es-
corted by uniformed court officers or Deputy Sheriffs. The jurors do not know
whether it is the Judge, the prosecutor or the defense attorney who has excused
them, and the inference is inescapable to both the excluded jurors and the public
that it is the State that has ordered the jurors to leave. When these jurors are so
excluded solely because of their race, the State cannot ignore its role in the dis-
crimination against them.
Id. at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1245, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 657. But see Note, supra note 8, at 52-53
(although Batson's finding of state action under fourteenth amendment was proper, "the
state action implicated in a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptories is much more
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that Batson applies to the defense since "the judicial enforcement
of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by de-
fense counsel constitutes 'State action'" under New York's equal
protection provision.26
Despite a criminal defendant's compelling interest in ob-
taining an impartial jury through the exercise of unfettered pe-
remptory challenges,27 the Kern court properly restricted defense
counsel's ability to discriminate racially through the exercise of pe-
remptory challenges. It is submitted that this limitation on a de-
fense counsel's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, as ar-
ticulated in Kern, should be extended to prohibit the exercise of
similar challenges based upon factors other than race.28
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees a criminal defendant the right to be tried by an impartial
jury.29 Although the amendment is silent as to the prosecution's
right to an impartial jury, New York courts have held that "[b]oth
the defense and the prosecution are entitled to a fair trial before
an impartial jury.,3 0 These efforts to keep the "scales" between the
attenuated").
2 Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 657, 554 N.E.2d at 1246, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 658.
17 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (peremptory challenges are necessary
component of jury trial); Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (peremptory
challenge is very important right of accused). Blackstone described the criminal defendant's
common-law right to use peremptories as "an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge"
which affords the accused "a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally dis-
concert him." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CommaNrARms 353. He concluded that no person "should
be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a... reason for ... his dislike." Id.;
see also Note, The Defendant's Right to Object to Prosecutorial Misuse of the Peremptory
Challenge, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1770, 1774 (1979) (peremptories grant lawyers freedom to fol-
low their hunches regarding prospective jurors).
20 See infra note 43 and accompanying text (citing lower court cases giving expansive
reading to Batson).
20 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides that the accused "shall enjoy
the right to ... an impartial jury." Id.; see also Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethink-
ing Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C.L. REv. 501, 542-45 (1986)
(examining meaning of "impartial jury"); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and
the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 353-55
(1982) (analyzing Supreme Court's interpretation of "impartial").
20 People v. Guzman, 125 Misc. 2d 457, 467, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 462 (Sup. Ct N.Y.
County 1984), aff'd, 148 A.D.2d 350, 538 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1st Dep't 1989), aff'd, 76 N.Y.2d 1,
555 N.E.2d 259, 556 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1990). The United States Supreme Court has also recog-
nized this right. See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965) (state has "legiti-
mate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried
before the tribunal ... most likely to produce a fair result"); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68,
70 (1887) ("impartiality requires not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but
also from any prejudice against his prosecution"). Historically, the New York State Legisla-
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prosecution and the defense "evenly held,"3' coupled with Batson's
reliance on the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause32
rather than the sixth amendment, 3 suggests that any effect Kern
may have on the accused's right to an impartial jury is properly
outweighed by the long-standing concerns of eliminating racial dis-
crimination from jury selection. 4
By prohibiting defense counsel from racially discriminating
through the exercise of peremptory challenges, the Kern decision
does not unconstitutionally encroach upon a criminal defendant's
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. Although significant,
the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not essential to ob-
taining an impartial jury.3 5 It is merely a statutory privilege," the
ture has endeavored to accord similar rights to both the prosecution and defense in the
selection of a jury. See People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 1064, 526 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 159 A.D.2d 651, 553 N.Y.S.2d 39 (2d
Dep't), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 740, 557 N.E.2d 1198, 558 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1990). For in-
stance, under Judiciary Law section 500, all litigants are given the right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross-section of the community. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 500 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
Relying on the United States Supreme Court's recognition that the state also has the right
to a fair trial, the court in Muriale stated that "[t]he historic intent of the Legislature...
would be violated if restraints against racial discrimination applied only to the prosecution."
Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d at 1064, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
31 Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70; see also Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Represen-
tation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1734 (1977) (providing overview of
cases supporting equal tieatment of prosecution and defense).
32 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4 (Court expressly resolves issue on equal protection
grounds and declines to express view on sixth amendment argument). Batson's invocation of
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause indicates the Court's desire to elimi-
nate racial discrimination for the benefit of all who participate in jury selection. Id. at 87-88.
New York courts have so recognized. See, e.g., Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d at 1061, 526 N.Y.S.2d
at 371 (rights protected in Batson include those of excluded jurors as well as criminal
defendants).
"' Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 n.4. Resort to a sixth amendment analysis would have re-
quired the Court to focus exclusively on the rights of the accused.
34 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). As long as a century ago, the
Supreme Court in Strauder stated:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied ... right to
participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color... is
practically a brand upon themn . . .[--] an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals
of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Id. at 308; see also Raphael, supra note 3, at 295 (noting that even 100 years after Strauder,
racial discrimination in the administration of justice and society as a whole continues to be
"a fact of life").
35 See People v. Thompson, 79 A.D.2d 87, 96, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739, 747 (2d Dep't 1981);
see also Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 551
(1977) (suggesting lawyers exercise peremptory challenges not to empanel impartial jurors,
but to obtain juries selectively predisposed to their position); Massaro, supra note 29, at 544
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restriction of which poses no threat of depriving a criminal defend-
ant of any constitutionally mandated right.3 7 Consequently, Kern
stands not as a barrier to an accused's ability to be tried impar-
tially,38 but as a profound message that racial discrimination in
New York courts will not be tolerated."
In addition, the Batson Court's rationale for restricting the
prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges applies
equally to the defense.40 Batson recognized that the harms racial
discrimination inflicts upon jury selection "touch[es] the entire
community" and "undermine[s] public confidence in the fairness
of our system of justice."41 However, by leaving defense counsel
free to discriminate on the basis of race, 2 Batson's restriction on
the freedom of prosecutors' to discriminate peremptorily accom-
plishes only half the measure necessary to eliminate racial discrim-
ination from the jury selection process. Kern effectively closes the
gap in the protection Batson created to achieve discriminatory-free
n.216 (same).
36 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (Constitution does not grant right to peremptories); Stil-
son v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (same); People v. Lobel, 298 N.Y. 243, 257, 82
N.E.2d 145, 152 (1948) (peremptory challenges "rest[] entirely with the Legislature") (cita-
tions omitted); see also supra note 1 (discussing CPL § 270.25).
37 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("the right of peremptory
challenge... may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of
impartial jury and fair trial") (citations omitted); Hayes, 120 U.S. at 71 (defendant may not
complain if tried by impartial jury because "nothing more" required by Constitution); Note,
Peremptory Challenge: Systematic Exclusion of Prospective Jurors on the Basis of Race,
39 Miss. L.J. 157, 159 (1967) (being tried by jury composed of members of same race is
"merely a fancied advantage; not a constitutional right"). Indeed, in Batson, due to the
inherent potential for racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges, see
Serr & Maney, supra note 3, at 7-8 ("[b]ecause peremptory challenges allow both the prose-
cutor and the defendant to strike a prospective juror at whim, they provide ample opportu-
nity to discriminate"), Justice Marshall advocated elimination of the peremptory challenge
entirely. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("only by banning perempto-
ries entirely can [racial] discrimination be ended."); see also Note, The Case For Abolishing
Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 239 (1986) (pe-
remptory challenges not constitutionally available).
3 See supra note 37.
31 See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
40 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (potential for racial discrimination exists in defendant's peremptories); id. at
126 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("[o]nce prosecutors are limited in their use of peremptory chal-
lenges, could we rationally hold that defendants are not?") (emphasis in original). But see
Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symme-
try and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. R.v. 808, 826-33 (1989) (arguing differ-
ent treatment for prosecution and defense justified).
41 Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
42 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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jury selection procedures in New York. Although Kern applies only
to the exercise of race-based peremptory challenges, the principles
promoted therein can and should be extended to prohibit the use
of peremptory challenges based upon factors other than race. New
York courts have already supported the application of Batson to
bar the prosecution's peremptory excusal of jurors based on char-
acteristics such as gender and hearing impairment.43 A further ex-
tension of Batson to prohibit such challenges by defense counsel
would be appropriate and consistent with the spirit of the Kern
decision.
The New York Court of Appeals in Kern properly recognized
the rights of New York citizens participating in jury selection to be
free of racial discrimination by the defense as well as the prosecu-
tion.44 Confronted with the task of balancing the equal protection
rights of criminal defendants against the equal protection rights of
prospective jurors, the Kern decision reflects New York's determi-
nation to eliminate discrimination from jury selection procedures.
Mindful of the abundant measures embodied in our criminal jus-
tice system to protect the rights of criminal defendants,45 the Kern
court properly resolved this issue in favor of the rights of New
York's jury-participating citizens. The decision could trigger other
states to broaden their state constitutions to surpass the protec-
tions presently afforded prospective jurors under Batson's inter-
pretation of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
Such results may then induce the Supreme Court to end its peren-
nial silence on this issue. 6
Lisa A. Stancati
New York Court of Appeals overrules Bartolomeo, allowing a sus-
pect represented by counsel on a prior pending charge to answer
questions on new unrelated charges in the absence of counsel
Traditionally, the New York Court of Appeals, relying on New
See People v. Blunt, 162 A.D.2d 86, 89, 561 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93 (2d Dep't 1990) (apply-
ing Batson to gender-based discrimination); People v. Irizarry, 560 N.Y.S.2d 279, 280 (1st
Dep't 1990) (same); People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130, 131 (Westchester Co. Ct. 1990) (ap-
plying Batson to prosecutor's peremptory excusal of hearing impaired juror).
" See' Kern, 75 N.Y.2d at 653-56, 554 N.E.2d at 1243-45, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 655-57.
'5 See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, and XIV; see also 4 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTA-
RIES, supra note 27 (describing peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that tenderness
and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous").
11 See supra note 4.
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